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Non-technical summary
In 2002, ten years after the Climate Convention was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit,
the world community is expected to implement a legally binding international
agreement on climate protection on the occasion of the forthcoming Earth Summit in
Johannesburg. This agreement goes back to the 3rd Conference of the Parties (COP3)
to the Climate Convention in 1997 in Kyoto where industrialized nations committed
themselves to reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases by roughly 5 % on average
as compared to their 1990 emission levels. The so-called Kyoto Protocol has been
celebrated as a breakthrough in international climate policy, because it implied – in
its original form – substantial emission reductions of the industrialized countries
vis-à-vis business-as-usual emissions. 
From the stance of standard economic theory, such an agreement with potentially large
economic adjustment costs would be hard to explain. Climate protection constitutes
the case of voluntarily providing a pure global public good which entails serious
incentive problems. In fact, according to standard economic theory, no country should
have an incentive to abate greenhouse gas emissions above its non-cooperative level.
In the short- to medium-run, the latter can be identified as the business-as-usual
emission level, since substantial adjustment costs occur instantly but benefits will only
arise in the far distant future. 
In this paper, we investigate whether the final outcome from 10 years of climate change
negotiations fits into the theoretical prediction of standard economic theory. Recent
changes to the Kyoto Protocol in fact seem to boil down climate policy to business-
as-usual without any compliance costs for participating countries. At second glance,
however, it appears that uncertainties on market power and future economic
development may turn the Kyoto Protocol into an agreement with effective emission
abatement and economic costs. Based on quantitative evidence from a large-scale
multi-region model of global trade and energy use, we argue that the predictive power
of standard economic theory still holds, because the costs arising from these
uncertainties are rather negligible.
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Abstract
Ten years after the initial Climate Change Convention from Rio in 1992, the developed world
is likely to ratify the Kyoto Protocol which has been celebrated as a milestone in climate
protection. Standard economic theory, however, casts doubt that Kyoto will go beyond
symbolic policy. In this paper we show that the final concretion of the Kyoto Protocol obeys
the theoretical prediction: Kyoto more or less boils down to business-as-usual without
significant compliance costs to ratifying parties.
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11. Introduction
In 2002, ten years after the Climate Convention was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit,
the world community is expected to implement a legally binding international agreement on
climate protection on the occasion of the forthcoming Earth Summit in Johannesburg. This
agreement goes back to the 3rd Conference of Parties (COP3) to the Climate Convention in
1997 in Kyoto where industrialized nations committed themselves to reducing their emissions
of greenhouse gases by roughly 5 % on average as compared to their 1990 emission levels
during the commitment period from 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC 1997). The so-called Kyoto
Protocol has been celebrated as a breakthrough in international climate policy, because it
implied - in its original form - substantial emission reductions of the industrialized countries
(as listed in Annex B of the Protocol) vis-à-vis business-as-usual emissions.
From the stance of standard economic theory, such an agreement with potentially large
economic adjustment costs to industrialized nations would be hard to explain. Climate
protection constitutes the case of voluntarily providing a pure global public good which
entails serious incentive problems. In fact, according to standard game theory, no country
should have an incentive to abate greenhouse gas emissions above its non-cooperative level.
In the short- to medium-run, the latter can be identified as the business-as-usual emission
level, since substantial adjustment costs occur instantly but benefits will only arise in the far
distant future.
In this paper, we investigate whether the final outcome from 10 years of climate
change negotiations obeys the theoretical prediction of standard economic theory. We show
that recent changes to the Kyoto Protocol in fact seem to boil down climate policy to
business-as-usual without any compliance costs for participating countries. At  second glance,
however, it appears that uncertainties on market power and future economic development may
turn the Kyoto Protocol into an agreement with effective emission abatement and economic
costs. Based on quantitative evidence from a large-scale multi-region model of global trade
and energy use, we argue that the predictive power of standard economic theory still holds,
because the costs arising from these uncertainties are rather negligible.
2. The Kyoto Protocol at first view: What theory predicts!
Climate protection poses the problem of providing  a global public good. Each country
has to decide on how much abatement of greenhouse gas emissions it wants to undertake. In
2the absence of any supranational authority, countries behave non-cooperatively, i.e. each
country decides according to a comparison of its own benefits from abatement and its own
costs of abatement.
Let there be n countries and let iq denote the abatement level of country i. Global
abatement, then, simply amounts to i
i
Q q= ∑ . National benefits from abatement depend on
the global abatement level, hence ( )i iB B Q= , while costs depend on the national abatement
level a single country chooses: ( )i i iC C q= . In this framework, non-cooperative behavior
simply means that countries try to maximize their own net benefit from abatement. The first
order condition to the optimization problem is given by i iB C′ ′= , i.e. countries choose
abatement levels that equate their own marginal benefits from abatement and their own
marginal abatement costs. In the literature, this solution is referred to as the non-cooperative
equilibrium of the n-countries global public good game or the Nash-Cournot outcome (Finus
2000). The non-cooperative equilibrium is suboptimal from a global planner point of view,
because the decentralized national decision maker does not recognize the positive externalities
spread on all other countries by its own abatement action. Furthermore, each country has an
incentive to free ride on abatement in other countries without contributing by its own, which
leads to the well-known prisoner-dilemma situation in climate policy.
For the purpose of our paper, it is necessary to quantify the compliance costs a country
is willing to accept in the non-cooperative solution. These costs can be assumed to be (close
to) zero. The reason is that for the problem of mitigating global warming, abatement measures
undertaken today will not unfold a stabilizing climate effect until far in the future. Hence,
benefits from climate protection will accrue to future generations, while costs have to be
carried by the current generation. In formal terms, ( ) 0;iB Q and hence ( ) 0=i iC q . Any
rational government, thus, will not enter an international agreement which is likely to impose
significant costs. Prima facie, the effective outcome of the Kyoto Protocol - after 5 years of
negotiation - backs the theoretical proposition. Table 1 provides the quantitative evidence.
The Kyoto Protocol negotiated in 1997 during the third Conference of Parties (COP3),
requires industrialized countries to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). The
limits have been set with reference to 1990 emission levels.
3Table 1: Baseline emissions, percentage reduction, absolute cutbacks 1
Region Baseline
Emissions
(MtC)a
Nominal
Reduction
(% wrt 1990)b
Effective
Reduction
(% wrt 2010)
Absolute
Cutback
(MtC wrt 2010)
1990 2010 OLD NEW OLD NEW OLD NEW
AUN 88 130 -6.8 -10.2 27.7 25.4 36 33
CAN 127 165 6.0 -7.9 27.7 17.0 46 28
EUR 929 1041 7.8 5.2 17.7 15.4 184 160
JPN 269 331 6.0 0.8 23.6 19.4 78 64
EEC 301 227 7.1 3.9 -23.2 -27.5 -53 -62
FSU 1036 713 0.0 -6.4 -45.3 -54.6 -323 -389
Total US outc 2750 2607 5.0 0.5 -0.7 -3.8 -32 -166
USA 1347 1809 7.0 3.2 30.8 27.9 556 505
Total US ind 4097 4416 5.0 0.5 11.9 7.7 525 339
Key: AUN – Australia and New Zealand, CAN – Canada, EUR - OECD Europe (incl. EFTA),
JPN – Japan, EEC - Central and Eastern Europe, FSU - Former Soviet Union (incl. Ukraine).
a Based on the IEO (2001): reference case
b Estimates by the European Commission (Nemry 2001)
c
 Annex-B without U.S. compliance
d
 Annex-B with U.S. compliance
Column “Baseline Emissions - 1990” of Table 1 lists the historic emissions for all
Annex B regions, while column “Nominal Reduction – OLD” provides the reduction targets
as originally foreseen by the Protocol.
The reduction targets with respect to 1990 are only nominal in the sense that they
apply to historic emission levels. Since these targets will not become legally binding before
the Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012), the appropriate reference for the effective cutback
requirements are the business-as-usual (BaU) emissions during the commitment period.
Column “Baseline Emissions - 2010” reports the projected BaU emissions for the central year
2010 based on the reference scenario of the most recent International Energy Outlook (IEO
2001) by the U.S. Department of Energy. Except for the economies in transition, which
include Eastern and Central Europe (EEC) as well as the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the
nominal commitments translate into much more stringent reduction requirements, since
industrialized countries are projected to have economic growth accompanied by a
considerable increase in GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion. For example, Australia
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 For reasons of data availability, we apply the GHG reduction targets to CO2 only, which is by far the
most important GHG among industrialized countries.
4and New Zealand (AUN) receive emission rights that are roughly 7 % higher than their 1990
reference emission levels, but in 2010 they will nevertheless face an effective cutback
requirement of nearly 28 % vis-à-vis their BaU emissions. Apparently, the economies in
transition have been endowed with emission entitlements under the Kyoto Protocol that are
well in excess of their anticipated future BaU emissions.2 As will be elaborated below, the
availability of these excess emissions, referred to as “hot air”, will crucially affect the
potential compliance costs of OECD countries under the Kyoto Protocol.
Column “Absolute Cutback – OLD” converts the effective percentage reduction into
absolute cutback requirements. An assessment of Table 1 with respect to the implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol in its original form (i.e. U.S. compliance and OLD targets) indicates
that the Kyoto Protocol demands a substantial cutback of BaU emissions for the industrialized
world. Even in the case of unrestricted Annex B trade in emission rights, which would allow
for the full availability of hot air from EEC and FSU, aggregate Annex B emissions are
supposed to fall by roughly 12 %  as compared to BaU.
More recently, however, there have been two major changes to the Kyoto Protocol
which – at first sight – will boil it down to BaU without any compliance costs to ratifying
countries.
In March 2001, the U.S. under President Bush, declared its withdrawal from the
Protocol, reasoning that the costs to the U.S. economy would be too high and exemption of
developing countries from binding emission targets would not be acceptable.3  In Table 1, the
last three rows illustrate the dramatic implications of U.S. withdrawal for the effectiveness of
the Kyoto Protocol. Without U.S. compliance, the effective aggregate cutback of the
remaining Annex B countries falls below zero, i.e. U.S. withdrawal implies an excess supply
of hot air. Given full tradability of emission rights across Annex B regions, which is most
likely after the latest COPs in Bonn and Marrakesh, competitive permit markets would drive
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 Obviously, hot air decreases the environmental effectiveness and economic costs of the Kyoto
Protocol vis-à-vis strictly domestic action. Concerns on the loss in environmental effectiveness due to
hot air have motivated intense debates between negotiating parties on the permissible scope of permit
trade (see e.g. Baron et al. 1999)).
3
 Note that irrespective of this move under the Bush administration, the prospects for U.S. ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol have been rather small over the years. The reason is the Byrd-Hagel resolution,
which makes "meaningful" participation of developing countries a conditio sine qua non for
ratification, and has been passed unanimously by the U.S. Senate in 1997 (The Byrd-Hagel
Resolution, U.S. Senate, 12 June 1997, 105th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Resolution 98). U.S.
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol would require a 2/3 majority in the Senate.
5down the international permit price to zero such that no emission reduction at all will occur
with respect to BaU.4
In the aftermath of U.S. withdrawal, the climate change negotiations at Bonn and
Marrakesh softened the reduction targets to remaining Annex B countries by conceding
substantial credits for carbon dioxide sinks, namely forests and agricultural soils that store the
greenhouse gas. Columns “NEW” in Table 1 show that these sink credits considerably water
down the provisions of the Protocol.
To summarize: The Kyoto Protocol comes at no costs to ratifying parties, because it
effectively boils down to business-as-usual without binding emission constraint. We simply
see what standard economic theory predicts.
3. At second glance: Kyoto is different from BaU but not much!
3.1 Market power and baseline projections
A more thorough assessment of the Kyoto Protocol reveals two major uncertainties
that warrant caution against our simple back-on-the-envelope calculation.
First, the assumption of perfectly competitive permit markets where the international
permit price falls to zero and emission sales do not create any revenues seems to be
implausible (Hahn (1984), Ellerman and Wing (2000), Woerdman (2000)). In general, the
likelihood of market power increases if the number of participants is smaller or if the size of
some participants is larger than neo-classical firm-to-firm trading with many participants.
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol creates an intergovernmental emissions trading market next
to or instead of firm trading, so it is uncertain whether firms or governments will participate
in international emissions trading. In the case of firm-to-firm trading, the scope for market
power seems rather limited. However, it is unlikely that as the dominant supplier of emission
rights due to large hot air entitlements the FSU will give up market power by leaving permit
trade to its domestic firms. On the demand side, competitive behavior seems to be the
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  It has been agreed that the use of emissions trading "shall be supplemental to domestic action and
domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party .... to meet
its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments ..." (UNFCCC 2001). The undefined
term "significant" gives sufficient leeway for comprehensive trading. The restrictive position by the
EU with respect to the permissible scope of emissions trading between industrialized countries has no
longer been held up since the Bonn conference. There are no concrete caps on the share of emissions
reductions a country can meet through the purchase of permits from other industrialized countries, nor
are there caps on the amount of permits it can sell.
6appropriate assumption. Either firms of OECD countries may be allowed to engage in
emissions trading directly5, or because - under the assumption of Party-to-Party trading -
coordination of several individual OECD countries within a demand cartel seems rather
difficult. As a monopolist, FSU will reduce its permit supply and charge a mark-up over its
marginal abatement costs (which are zero for hot air) to maximize profits. The international
permit price will no longer be zero (as in the competitive case above) imposing non-zero
compliance costs on industrialized countries with positive cutback requirements.
Second, a different perspective on how economies and emissions could evolve in the
future might imply an effective demand in emission rights vis-a-vis a situation with an excess
permit supply as suggested by Table 1. Since abatement costs associated with the
implementation of the Kyoto emission constraints crucially depend on the business-as-usual
(BaU) projections for GDP and emissions, any careful analysis of the potential costs
associated with the implementation of the  Kyoto Protocol requires sensitivity analysis with
respect to alternative baselines.
3.2 Assessing the costs of Kyoto
Market power and alternative baseline projections could significantly alter the
economic costs of implementing Kyoto such that our initial conclusion might fail. Our main
interest, then, is to assess how much the implied costs for major Annex B parties differ from
zero when market power and alternative baselines are taken into account. In order to obtain
such cost estimates we make use of a computable general equilibrium model of world trade
and energy use. The general equilibrium approach provides a consistent and comprehensive
framework for studying price-dependent interactions between the energy system and the rest
of the economy. This is important since carbon abatement policies not only cause direct
adjustments on fossil fuel markets but also produce indirect spillovers to other markets which
in turn feed back to the economy. Therefore, computable general equilibrium models have
become the standard tool for the analysis of the economy-wide impacts of greenhouse gas
abatement policies on resource allocation and the associated implications for incomes of
economic agents (Bergman 1990, Grubb et al. 1993, Weyant 1999).
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  See e.g. the plans of the EU commission to implement an EU internal trading system starting in
2005 with firm-to-firm trading across energy-intensive industries (COM 2000).
7The concrete multi-sector, multi-region model underlying our analysis has been
widely used in the past to quantify the economic impacts of GHG abatement (Böhringer 2000,
Rutherford and Paltsev 2000, Böhringer 2002, Böhringer and Löschel 2002). In the standard
model version, all factor and commodity markets are assumed to be competitive. For our
simulations, we drop this assumption with respect to permit trade and treat FSU as a
monopoly supplier of permits. Profit-maximizing behavior then entails the equalization of
marginal abatement cost and perceived marginal revenue, which implies that the permit price
set by FSU is a markup on marginal cost. Obviously, the markup rate is a decreasing function
of the  price elasticity of permit demand. Since the concrete formula for the endogenous price
elasticity is intractable analytically, we represent the mark-up in the model as an export tariff
which drives a wedge between the international permit price and the marginal abatement costs
in FSU. The mark-up has the same effect as a quota on the sales of permits where the quota
rents accrue to FSU. In order to determine the optimal tariff or quota numerically, we raise the
tariff of FSU in sufficiently small steps and then identify that rate which maximizes its
welfare.
 For the sake of brevity, we abstain here from a comprehensive description of the
model algebra and its parameterization, which are available as a download from
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/rio+10.pdf. In our simulations, we measure the economic
and environmental consequences of abatement policies with respect to the BaU situation in
2010.
Table 2 summarizes the main economic and environmental effects of four abatement
scenarios which reflect the recent history of climate change negotiations after the signature of
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Scenario NTRin_OLD considers the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol based on the original reduction targets, U.S. compliance and fully domestic action
(i.e. no trade in emission rights). Adjustment costs – measured in percentage loss of BaU
consumption – range from 0.2 % for EUR to 1.5 % for CAN indicating differences in the
effective cutback requirements, the ease of carbon substitution within production and
consumption, and indirect losses or benefits through terms-of-trade effects.6 The latter are the
reason why EEC and FSU as well as ROW are affected by abatement policies of trading
partners even though they do not face a binding emission constraint. Terms-of-trade effects
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 For a detailed discussion of the sources and magnitude of terms-of-trade effects from carbon
abatement see Böhringer and Rutherford (2002).
8work primarily through the decline of international fuel prices following the drop in energy
demand under emission reduction policies: As a net fuel importer, EEC benefits from cheaper
energy imports, while FSU and ROW, which are net fuel exporters, are negatively affected.
Converting the percentage changes in consumption into payments per capita, the
specific costs for abating OECD regions range from 23 USD/capita of EUR to 162
USD/capita for CAN. The compliance costs for the U.S. amounts to 92 USD. As we can see
from column NTRout_OLD, non-compliance of the U.S. leaves the remaining OECD
countries with considerable costs although fuel exporting regions AUN and, particularly, CAN
benefit from U.S. withdrawal through a smaller drop in world energy prices.
U.S. withdrawal has triggered two further concretions to the Kyoto Protocol. On the
one hand, a generous accounting of carbon sink credits has been approved.7 On the other
hand, parties have implicitly agreed on unrestricted Annex B emissions trading.
The scenario NTRout_NEW shows that sink credits considerably reduce compliance
costs, but the effective financial burden is still significant (with up to 90 USD per capita for
AUN) if regions meet their targets through domestic action.
The drastic drop in costs for OECD countries comes from unrestricted Annex B
emissions trading as captured in scenario TRDout_NEW, where we reflect scientific evidence
on market power by FSU.8 Although the compliance costs under monopolistic hot air supply
by FSU is still different from zero, comparison of cost figures under the initial Kyoto setting
(NTRin_OLD) and its final concretion clearly backs our initial proposition that Kyoto should
come close to business-as-usual. Note in this context, that the cost figures reported for
monopolistic permit trade must be seen as an upper bound since the Clean Developing
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol allows the purchase of abatement from non-
Annex B countries, which lowers FSU monopoly power.
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 The striking example is Russia. In addition to hot air, the Russian forest management sink quota
under Article 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol was increased from 17.63 Mt carbon per year to 33 Mt at
COP7 in Marrakesh although it has been clear that these credits are oversized.  Obviously, Russia took
advantage of its bargaining power, since – after U.S. withdrawal – the Kyoto Protocol would fail
without Russian ratification (N.B.: The Kyoto agreement will not enter into force until it has been
ratified by at least 55 countries, and these ratifying countries must have contributed at least 55 % of
the industrialized world's CO2 emissions in 1990).
8
 With Annex B emissions trading EEC and FSU do substantially better than under BaU since they can
capitalize on larger amounts of hot air.
9In line with the decrease in compliance costs, global environmental effectiveness
drops towards zero when we incorporate step-for-step the changes to the initial Protocol.
Based on the quantitative evidence from Table 2, we conclude that Kyoto is different from
BaU but not much.
Table 2: Economic and environmental impacts of implementing the Kyoto Protocol
NTRin_OLD NTRout_OLD NTRout_NEW TRDout_NEW
Consumption change in % vs. BaU
AUN -1,18 -1,09 -0,93 -0,29
CAN -1,48 -0,62 -0,29 -0,13
EUR -0,17 -0,24 -0,19 -0,06
JPN -0,26 -0,34 -0,22 -0,05
EEC 0,49 0,27 0,22 0,75
FSU -0,93 -0,69 -0,59 0,38
USA -0,51 0,01 0,01 0,00
ROW -0,35 -0,19 -0,15 -0,03
TOTAL -0,24 -0,12 -0,09 -0,01
Consumption change in USD97 per capita
AUN -114 -107 -90 -28
CAN -162 -68 -32 -15
EUR -23 -31 -24 -8
JPN -53 -67 -43 -9
EEC 8 4 3 12
FSU -12 -9 -7 5
USA -92 - - -
Emission reduction in % vs. BaU
TOTAL 9,6 2,8 2,3 0,7
3.3 Sensitivity analysis: the role of alternative baselines
The results of Table 2 are based on the reference scenario of the most recent
International Energy Outlook (IEO 2001). In addition, IEO reports extensive data for
projections where the growth potential of the world economy is considered either more
pessimistic (case: LOW) or more optimistic (case: HIGH). Lower economic growth is linked
to lower demands for fossil fuels and lower BaU carbon emissions. The opposite applies for
higher economic growth. Table 3 provides a condensed summary of results for alternative
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baseline projections focusing on scenario TRDout_NEW which reflects the final concretion of
the Kyoto Protocol. As expected,  the nominal Kyoto reduction targets translate into less
stringent emission constraints for the LOW case and more stringent reduction requirements for
the HIGH case, resulting in lower or higher compliance costs respectively for OECD
countries. Conversely, EEC and FSU do better for the HIGH case than for the LOW case
because they draw higher profits from the sales of  emission rights.
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis for alternative baseline projections (TRDout_NEW)
LOW REFERENCE HIGH
Consumption change in % vs. BaU
AUN -0,13 -0,35
CAN -0,05 -0,18
EUR -0,02 -0,09
JPN -0,01 -0,07
EEC 0,38 0,68
FSU 0,09 0,60
USA 0,00 0,00
ROW -0,02 -0,03
TOTAL -0,01 -0,02
Consumption change in USD97 per capita
AUN -14 -34
CAN -6 -21
EUR -3 -11
JPN -2 -14
EEC 7 12
FSU 1 7
USA - -
Emission reduction in % vs. BaU
TOTAL 0,3 1,0
4. Conclusion
Ten years after the initial Climate Change Convention from Rio in 1992, the
developed world is likely to ratify the Kyoto Protocol which sets legally binding emission
reduction targets to industrialized countries. Climate policy makers have already celebrated
11
the forthcoming ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as a milestone in climate protection.
Standard economic theory, however, casts doubt that Kyoto will go beyond symbolic policy.
Climate protection corresponds to the voluntary provision of a global public good, exhibiting
severe incentive problems. Moreover, the benefits of emission abatement arise in the far
distant future, while abatement costs have to be borne by the current generations.  Short- to
medium-run rational policy making, hence, suggests that countries not enter an international
environmental agreement which causes larger adjustment costs.
In this paper, we have quantified the final outcome of the Kyoto Protocol in economic
and environmental terms to compare it with the theoretical prediction. We have shown that
uncertainties on the future economic development and market power in emissions trading
might prevent Kyoto from boiling down to purely symbolic policy. However, even for high
growth projections and extreme assumptions on market power, Kyoto is not much different
from business-as-usual without effective emission constraint. The residual costs for OECD
countries complying to the Kyoto Protocol are rather small and may reasonably be interpreted
as governments’ willingness to appease voters who want to see some climate policy action but
are not willing to pay much.
References
Baron, R., M. Bosi, A. Lanza and J. Pershing (1999), A Preliminary Analysis of the EU
Proposals on the Kyoto Mechanisms, Energy and Environment Division, International
Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/new/releases/1999/eurpro/eurlong.html
Bergman, L. (1990), The Development of Computable General Equilibrium Models, in
Bergman, L., D. W. Jorgenson and E. Zalai (eds.): General Equilibrium Modeling and
Economic Policy Analysis, Cambridge, 3-30.
COM (2000) Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading within the European Union,
COM 2000/87, European Commission, Brussels.
Böhringer, C. (2000), Cooling Down Hot Air - A Global CGE Analysis of Post-Kyoto Carbon
Abatement Strategies, Energy Policy, 28, 779-789.
Böhringer, C. (2002), From Kyoto to Bonn: From Little to Nothing?, The Energy Journal 23
(2) (forthcoming).
Böhringer, C. and A. Löschel (2002), Economic Impacts of Carbon Abatement Strategies, in:
C. Böhringer, M. Finus and C. Vogt (eds.), Controlling Global Warming – Perspectives
12
from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, (New
Horizons in Environmental Economics) (forthcoming)
Böhringer, C. and T. F. Rutherford (2002), Carbon Abatement and International Spillovers,
Environmental and Resource Economics (forthcoming).
Ellerman, A.D. and I. S. Wing (2000), Supplementarity: An Invitation for Monopsony, The
Energy Journal, 21 (4), 29-59.
Finus, M. (2001), Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK.
Grubb, M., J. Edmonds, P. ten Brink and M. Morrison (1993), The Costs of Limiting Fossil-
fuel CO2 Emissions: A Survey and Analysis, Annual Review of Energy and
Environment, 18, 397-478.
Hahn, R. W. (1984), ‘Market Power in Transferable Property Rights’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 99, 753-765.
IEO (2001), International Energy Outlook 2001, U.S.Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov.
Nemry, F. (2001), LULUCF39 v4 - Quantitative implications of the decision -/CP.7 on
LULUCF, Personal Communication.
Rutherford, T.F. and S.V. Paltsev (2000), GTAP-Energy in GAMS, University of Colorado,
Working Paper 00-2, http://debreu.colorado.edu/download/gtap-eg.html
UNFCCC (1997), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
FCCC/CP/L.7/Add.1, Kyoto.
UNFCCC (2001), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate, Review of the
implementation of commitments and of other provisions of the Convention,
FCCC/CP/2001/L.7, VI, 5.
Weyant, J. (ed.) (1999), The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation, The
Energy Journal, Special Issue.
Woerdman, E. (2000), Competitive Distortions in an International Emissions Trading Market,
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 5 (4), 337-360.
13
Appendix A: Detailed Algebraic Model Description
This section outlines the main characteristics of a generic static general equilibrium
model of the world economy designed for the medium-run economic analysis of carbon
abatement constraints. It is a well-known Arrow-Debreu model that concerns the interaction
of consumers and producers in markets. Consumers in the model have a primary exogenous
endowment of the commodities and a set of preferences giving demand functions for each
commodity. The demands depend on all prices; they are continuous and non-negative,
homogenous of degree zero in factor prices and satisfy Walras’ Law, i.e. the total value of
consumer expenditure equals consumer income at any set of prices. Market demands are the
sum of final and intermediate demands. Producers maximize profits given a constant returns
to scale production technology. Because of the homogeneity of degree zero of the demand
functions and the linear homogeneity of the profit functions in prices, only relative prices
matter in such a model. Two classes of conditions characterize the competitive equilibrium in
the model: market clearance conditions and zero profit conditions. In equilibrium, price levels
and production levels in each industry are such that market demand equals market supply for
each commodity. Profit maximization under a constant returns to scale technology implies
that no activity does any better than break even at equilibrium prices. The model is a system
of simultaneous, non-linear equations with the number of equations equal to the number of
variables.
A.1 Production
Within each region (indexed by the subscript r), each producing sector (indexed
interchangeable by i and j) is represented by a single-output producing firm which chooses
input and output quantities in order to maximize profits. Firm behavior can be construed as a
two-stage procedure in which the firm selects the optimal quantities of primary factors k
(indexed by f) and intermediate inputs x from other sectors in order to minimize production
costs given input prices and some production level Y = ϕ (k,x).
The second stage, given an exogenous output price, is the selection of the output level
Y to maximize profits. The firm’s problem is then:
( ) ( )
, ,
, , . . ,
jir jir fir
ir ir ir ir jr fr ir ir ir jir fir
y x k
Max p Y C p w Y s t Y x kϕΠ = ⋅ − =
 [1]
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where Π denotes the profit functions, C the cost functions which relate the minimum
possible total costs of producing Y to the positive input prices, technology parameters, and the
output quantity Y, and p and w are the prices for goods and factors, respectively.
Production of each good takes place according to constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production functions, which exhibit constant returns to scale. Therefore, the output
price equals the per-unit cost in each sector, and firms make zero profits in equilibrium
(Euler’s Theorem). Profit maximization under constant returns to scale implies the
equilibrium condition:
( , ) 0ir ir ir jr frp c p wpi = − =     (zero profit condition)           [2]
where c and pi are the unit cost and profit functions, respectively.
Demand functions for goods and factors can be derived by Shepard’s Lemma. It
suggests that the first-order differentiation of the cost function with respect to an input price
yields the cost-minimizing demand function for the corresponding input. Hence, the
intermediate demand for good j in sector i is:
ir irjir ir
jr jr
C c
x Y
p p
∂ ∂
= = ⋅
∂ ∂
                                          [3]
and the demand for factor f in sector i is:
ir ir
fir ir
fr fr
C ck Y
w w
∂ ∂
= = ⋅
∂ ∂
                                        [4]
The profit functions possess a corresponding derivative property (Hotelling’s Lemma):
ir irjir ir
jr jr
x Y
p p
pi∂ Π ∂
= = ⋅
∂ ∂
  and  ir irfir ir
fr fr
k Y
w w
pi∂ Π ∂
= = ⋅
∂ ∂
         [5]
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The variable, price dependent input coefficients, which appear subsequently in the
market clearance conditions, are thus:
x ir irjir
jr jr
c
a
p p
pi∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
  and  k ir irfir
fr fr
c
a
w w
pi∂ ∂
= =
∂ ∂
             [6]
The model captures the production of commodities by aggregate, hierarchical (or
nested) constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions that characterize the
technology through substitution possibilities between capital, labor, energy and material (non-
energy) intermediate inputs (KLEM). Two types of production functions are employed: those
for fossil fuels (in our case v = COL, CRU, GAS) and those for non-fossil fuels (in our case n
= EIS, ELE, OIL, ROI).
Figure A.1 illustrates the nesting structure in non-fossil fuel production. In the
production of non-fossil fuels nr, non-energy intermediate inputs M (used in fixed coefficients
among themselves) are employed in (Leontief) fixed proportions with an aggregate of capital,
labor and energy at the top level. At the second level, a CES function describes the
substitution possibilities between the aggregate energy input E and the value-added aggregate
KL (For the sake of simplicity, the symbols α, β, φ and θ are used throughout the model
description to denote the technology coefficients.):
( ) 1/min 1 ,
KLE
KLE KLE
nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nrY M E KL
ρ
ρ ρθ θ φ α β
   
= − +     
       [7]
with σ KLE = 1/(1-ρ KLE) the elasticity of substitution between energy and the primary
factor aggregate and θ the input (Leontief) coefficient. Finally, at the third level, capital and
labor factor inputs trade-off with a constant elasticity of substitution σ KL:
1/ KLKL KL
nr nr nr nr nr nrKL K L
ρ
ρ ρφ α β = +   .                             [8]
As to the formation of the energy aggregate E, we employ several levels of nesting to
represent differences in substitution possibilities between primary fossil fuel types as well as
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substitution between the primary fossil fuel composite and secondary energy, i.e. electricity.
The energy aggregate is a CES composite of electricity and primary energy inputs FF with
elasticity σ E = 1/(1-ρ E) at the top nest:
1/ EE E
nr nr nr nr nr nrE ELE FF
ρ
ρ ρφ α β = +   .                       [9]
The primary energy composite is defined as a CES function of coal and the composite
of refined oil and natural gas with elasticity σ COA = 1/(1-ρ COA). The oil-gas composite is
assumed to have a simple Cobb-Douglas functional form with value shares given by θ :
( ) 1/1
COA
COA
COA
nr nr
nr nr nr nr nrFF COA OIL GAS
ρ
ρθ θρφ α β − = + ⋅   
 . [10]
Figure A.1: Nesting structure of non-fossil fuel production
Fossil fuel resources v are modeled as graded resources. The structure of production of
fossil fuels is given in Figure A.2. It is characterized by the presence of a fossil fuel resource
in fixed supply. All inputs, except for the sector-specific resource R, are aggregated in fixed
proportions at the lower nest. Mine managers minimize production costs subject to the
technology constraint:
MCRU
Y
σ = 0
σ KLE
OIL GAS
COA
ELE
σ E
σ COA
σ = 1
FF
E
K L
KL
σ KL
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( )
1/
min , , ,
f
vff v
v K L E M
vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr vr jvrY R K L E M
ρ
ρρφ α β θ θ θ θ
   = +     
 [11]
The resource grade structure is reflected by the elasticity of substitution between the
fossil fuel resource and the capital-labor-energy-material aggregate in production. The
substitution elasticity between the specific factor and the Leontief composite at the top level is
σvr
f
 = 1/(1-ρvrf). This substitution elasticity is calibrated in consistency with an exogenously
given supply elasticity of fossil fuel εvr according to
1 fvr
vr vr
vr
γ
ε σ
γ
−
=                                             [12]
with γvr the resource value share.
Figure A.2: Nesting structure for fossil fuel production
We now turn to the derivation of the factor demand functions for the nested CES
production functions, taking into account the duality between the production function and the
cost function The total cost function that reflects the same production technology as the CES
production function for e.g. value added KL in non-fossil fuel production given by [8] is:
( )1 11 11 KLKL KL KL KLKL
nr nr nr nr nr nr
nr
C PK PL KL
σ
σ σ σ σα βφ
−
− − 
= + ⋅      [13]
MEL
σ = 0
K
Y
R
σ  f
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where PK and PL are the per-unit factor costs for the industry including factor taxes if
applicable. The price function for the value-added aggregate at the third level is:
( )1 11 11 KLKL KL KL KL KL
nr nr nr nr nr nr
nr
PKL PK PL c
σ
σ σ σ σα βφ
−
− − 
= + =               [14]
Shepard’s Lemma gives the price-dependent composition of the value-added
aggregate as:
   
1
KL
KL
nr nr
nr nr
nr nr
K PKL
KL PK
σ
σφ α−  = ⋅   , 
1
KL
KL
nr nr
nr nr
nr nr
L PKL
KL PL
σ
σφ β−  = ⋅    [15]
In order to determine the variable input coefficient for capital and labor anrK = Knr / Ynr
and anrL = Lnr / Ynr , one has to multiply [15] with the per unit demand for the value added
aggregate KLnr / Ynr, which can be derived in an analogous manner. The cost function
associated with the production function [7] is:
 ( )
$
 
1
11 11
KLE KLE KLEKLE KLE
nr
nrnr nr nr nr nrnr
nr
PY PM PE PKL
σ σ σσ σθθ α βφ
−
− −
 
= − + +  
[16]
and
$ 
1
KLE
KLE
nr nr
nr nr nr
nr nr
KL PY
Y PKL
σ
σθ φ β−  = ⋅                         [17]
with θnr the KLE value share in total production. The variable input coefficient for e.g.
labor is then:
$ 
11
KL KLE
KLEKLL nr nr
nr nr nr nrnr nr
nr nr
PKL PY
a
PL PKL
σ σ
σσθ φ φ β β−−    = ⋅ ⋅           [18]
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A.2 Households
In each region, private demand for goods and services is derived from utility
maximization of a representative household subject to a budget constraint given by the
income level INC. The agent is endowed with the supplies of the primary factors of
production (natural resources used for fossil fuel production, labor and capital) and tax
revenues. In our comparative-static framework, overall investment demand is fixed at the
reference level. The household’s problem is then:
( ) . .
ir
frr ir r fr r ir ird f i
Max W d s t INC w k TR p d= + =∑ ∑           [19]
where W is the welfare of the representative household in region r, d denotes the final
demand for commodities, k  is the aggregate factor endowment of the representative agent and
TR are total tax revenues. Household preferences are characterized by a CES utility function.
As in production, the maximization problem in [1] can thus be expressed in form of an unit
expenditure function e or welfare price index pw, given by:
( )r r irpw e p=                                                  [20]
Compensated final demand functions are derived from Roy’s Identity as:
r
rir
ir
ed INC
p
∂
=
∂
                                              [21]
with INC  the initial level of expenditures.
In the model, welfare of the representative agent is represented as a CES composite of
a fossil fuel aggregate and a non-fossil fuel consumption bundle. Substitution patterns within
the latter are reflected via a Cobb-Douglas function. The fossil fuel aggregate in final demand
consists of the various fossil fuels (fe = COL, OIL, GAS) trading off at a constant elasticity of
substitution. The CES utility function is:
1/
/
, ,
C
CC F
F j
r r fe r r jrfe rfe j fe
U C C
ρ
ρρ ρ
θρα β φ
∉
     =   +         
∑ ∏             [22]
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where the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy composites is
given by σC = 1/(1-ρC), the elasticity of substitution within the fossil fuel aggregate by σFE =
1/(1-ρFE), and θj are the value shares in non-fossil fuel consumption. The structure of final
demand is presented in Figure A.3.
Total income of the representative agent consists of factor income, revenues from
taxes levied on output, intermediate inputs, exports and imports, final demand as well as tax
revenues from CO2 taxes (TR) and a baseline exogenous capital flow representing the balance
of payment deficits B less expenses for exogenous total investment demand PI⋅I. The
government activity is financed through lump-sum levies. It does not enter the utility function
and is hence exogenous in the model. The budget constraint is then given by:
r r vr rr r r r vr r r r
v
PC C PL L PK K PR R TR B PI I⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + − ⋅∑      [23]
with C the aggregate household consumption in region r and PC its associated price.
Figure A.3: Structure of household demand
A.3 Foreign Trade
All commodities are traded in world markets and characterized by product
differentiation. There is imperfect transformability (between exports and domestic sales of
domestic output) and imperfect substitutability (between imports and domestically sold
domestic output). Bilateral trade flows are subject to export taxes, tariffs and transportation
costs and calibrated to the base year 1995. There is an imposed balance of payment constraint
to ensure trade balance, which is warranted through flexible exchange rates, incorporating the
benchmark trade deficit or surplus for each region.
On the output side, two types of differentiated goods are produced as joint products for
sale in the domestic markets and the export markets, respectively. The allocation of output
CRU OTHEISELE
σ = 1
σ
 C
C
COL GASOIL
σ FE
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between domestic sales D and international sales X is characterized by a constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) function. Hence, firms maximize profits subject to the constraint:
1/
ir ir ir irir irY D X
ηη ηφ α β = +                                   [24]
with σ tr = 1/(1 + η) the transformation elasticity.
Regarding imports, the standard Armington convention is adopted in the sense that
imported and domestically produced goods of the same kind are treated as incomplete
substitutes (i. e. wine from France is different from Italian wine). The aggregate amount of
each (Armington) good A is divided among imports and domestic production:
1/ DD D
ir ir ir irir irA D M
ρ
ρ ρφ α β = +                            [25]
In this expression σ D = 1/(1-ρ D) is the Armington elasticity between domestic and
imported varieties. Imports M are allocated among import regions s according to a CES
function:
1/ M
M
ir ir ir isr
s
M X
ρ
ρφ α =   ∑
                               [26]
with X the amount of exports from region s to region r and σ M = 1/(1-ρ M) the
Armington elasticity among imported varieties. Intermediate as well as final demands are,
hence, (nested CES) Armington composites of domestic and imported varieties.
The assumption of product differentiation permits the model to match bilateral trade
with cross-hauling of trade and avoids unrealistically strong specialization effects in response
to exogenous changes in trade (tax) policy.
A.4 Carbon emissions
Carbon emissions are associated with fossil fuel consumption in production,
investment, government and private demand. Each unit of a fuel emits a known amount of
carbon where different fuels have different carbon intensities. The applied carbon coefficients
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are 25 MT carbon per EJ for coal, 14 MT carbon per EJ for gas and 20 MT carbon per EJ for
refined oil.
Carbon policies are introduced via an additional constraint that holds carbon emissions
to a specified limit. The solution of the model gives a shadow value on carbon associated with
this carbon constraint. This dual variable or shadow price can be interpreted as the price of
carbon permits in a carbon permit system or as the CO2 tax that would induce the carbon
constraint in the model. The shadow value of the carbon constraint equals the marginal cost of
reduction. It indicates the incremental cost of reducing carbon at the carbon constraint. The
total costs represent the resource cost or dead-weight loss to the economy of imposing carbon
constraints. Carbon emission constraints induce substitution of fossil fuels with less expensive
energy sources (fuel switching) or employment of less energy-intensive manufacturing and
production techniques (energy savings). The only means of abatement are hence inter-fuel and
fuel-/non-fuel substitution or the reduction of intermediate and final consumption.
Given an emission constraint producers as well as consumers must pay this price on
the emissions resulting from the production and consumption processes. Revenues coming
from the imposition of the carbon constraint are given to the representative agent. The total
cost of Armington inputs in production and consumption that reflects the CES production
technology in [25] but takes CO2 emission restrictions into account is:
( )1 11 1 DD D A DA
ir ir ir ir ir r i irC PD PM a A
σ
σ σ σ σα β τ
−
− −
   = + + ⋅ ⋅    
   [27]
with ai the carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i and τ the shadow price of CO2
in region r associated with the carbon emission restriction:
2r ir i
i
CO A a= ⋅∑                                                  [28]
where 2rCO  is the endowment of carbon emission rights in region r.
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A.5 Zero Profit and Market Clearance Conditions
The equilibrium conditions in the model are zero profit and market clearance
conditions. Zero profit conditions as derived in [2] require that no producer earns an “excess”
profit in equilibrium. The value of inputs per unit activity must be equal to the value of
outputs. The zero profit conditions for production, using the variable input coefficient derived
above, is:
K L M
ir ir ir ir j jir ir ir ir
j
PK a Y PL a Y PA a Y PY Y⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅∑ .             [29]
The market clearance conditions state that market demand equals market supply for all
inputs and outputs. Market clearance conditions have to hold in equilibrium. Domestic
markets clear, equating aggregate domestic output plus imports, i.e. total Armington good
supply, to aggregate demand, which consists of intermediate demand, final demand,
investment and government demand:
Y
jr r
ir jr r
ir irj
e
A Y C
PA PA
pi∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂∑                                  [30]
with PA the price of the Armington composite. piirZ is the per unit zero profit function
with Z the name assigned to the associated production activity. The derivation of piirZ , with
respect to input and output prices, yields the compensated demand and supply coefficients,
e.g. ∂ pijrY / ∂ PAir = aijrA the intermediate demand for Armington good i in sector j of region r
per unit of output Y. Output for the domestic market equals total domestic demand:
AY jrir
ir jr
ir irj
Y A
PD PD
pipi ∂∂
=
∂ ∂∑                                  [31]
with PD the domestic commodity price. Export supply equals import demand across
all trading partners:
Y M
ir is
ir is
ir irs
Y M
PX PX
pi pi∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂∑                                 [32]
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with PX the export price. Aggregate import supply equals total import demand:
A
ir
ir ir
ir
M A
PM
pi∂
=
∂
                                          [33]
where PM is the import price.
Primary factor endowment equals primary factor demand:
Y
ir
r ir
ri
L Y
PL
pi∂
=
∂∑ ,                                                [34]
Y
ir
r ir
ri
K Y
PK
pi∂
=
∂∑ ,                                              [35]
Y
vr
vr vr
vr
R Y
PR
pi∂
=
∂
.                                                [36]
An equilibrium is characterized by a set of prices in the different goods and factor
markets such that the zero profit and market clearance conditions stated above hold.
A.6 International Permit Trade and Monopolistic Permit Supply
Under competitive permit trading, all countries can import or export CO2 permits
considering the international permit price as exogenous. The zero-profit condition for export
activities of country r is given as weak inequality:
0Π = − ≤CEXPr rP τ .                                                [37]
where P is the international permit price, τr reflects the domestic carbon price (see [28]) and
CEXPr is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of CO2 exports from
region r . Likewise, the zero-profit condition for import activities of country r is given by:
0Π = − ≤CIMPr r Pτ .                                                [38]
where CIMPr is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of CO2 imports
in region r.
The market clearance condition for tradable permits is:
=∑ ∑r r
r r
CEXP CIMP .                                                [39]
where P - the international permit price - is the associated dual variable.
Monopolistic permit supply is characterized as a situation where one country  - in our
case FSU - has supply power in the permit market while all other countries behave as price
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takers. The monopolist sets the permit price as a markup on its marginal abatement costs to
maximize profits (with the usual inverse relationship between the markup rate and the price
elasticity of permit demand). Given the complexity of functional forms in our CGE
framework, it is not possible to  derive an algebraic formula for the markup rate. We therefore
represent the markup in the model as an export tariff which drives a wedge between the
international permit price and the marginal abatement costs in FSU:
(1 ) 0Π = − + ≤
FSUFSU FSU
EXP EXPP tτ .                                                [40]
The markup is equivalent to a quota on the sales of permits where the quota rents
accrue to FSU. In order to determine the optimal tariff or quota numerically, we raise the
tariff of FSU in sufficiently small steps and then identify that rate which maximises its
welfare in terms of real consumption C.
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A.7 Overview of Elasticities
Table A.1 provides a summary of elasticity values adopted for the core simulations.
Table A.1: Default values of key substitution and supply elasticities
________________________________________________________
Description Value
_________________________________________________________
Substitution elasticities in non-fossil fuel production
σ KLE Energy vs. value added 0.5
σ KL Capital vs. labor 1.0
σ E Electricity vs. primary energy inputs 0.3
σ COL Coal vs. gas-oil 0.5
Substitution elasticities in final demand
σ C Fossil fuels vs. non-fossil fuels 0.8
σ FE Fossil fuels vs. fossil fuels 0.3
Elasticities in international trade (Armington)
σ D Substitution elasticity between the import 2.0
      composite vs. domestic inputs
σ M Substitution elasticity between imports from 4.0
      different regions forming the import composite
σ tr Transformation elasticity domestic vs. export 4.0
Exogenous supply elasticities of fossil fuels ε
Crude oil 1.0
Coal 1.0
Natural gas 1.0
_________________________________________________________
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Appendix B: Benchmark Data - Regional and Sectoral Aggregation
The model is built on a comprehensive energy-economy dataset that accommodates a
consistent representation of energy markets in physical units as well as detailed accounts of
regional production and bilateral trade flow. The underlying data base is GTAP-EG (version
5) which reconciles the most recent GTAP economic production and trade dataset for the year
1997 with OECD/IEA energy statistics for 50 regions and 23 sectors (Rutherford and Paltsev
2000). Benchmark data determine parameters of the functional forms from a given set of
benchmark quantities, prices, and elasticities. Sectors and regions of the original GTAP-EG
data set are aggregated according to Tables B.1 and B.2 to yield the model’s sectors and
regions.
Table B.1: Sectoral aggregation
Sectors in GTAP-EG
AGR Agricultural products NFM Non-ferrous metals
CNS Construction NMM Non-metallic minerals
COL Coal OIL Refined oil products
CRP Chemical industry OME Other machinery
CRU Crude oil OMF Other manufacturing
DWE Dwellings OMN Mining
ELE Electricity and heat PPP Paper-pulp-print
FPR Food products SER Commercial and public services
GAS Natural gas works T_T Trade margins
I_S Iron and steel industry TRN Transport equipment
LUM Wood and wood-products TWL Textiles-wearing apparel-leather
Mapping from GTAP-EG sectors to model sectors as of Table 1
Energy
COL Coal COL
CRU Crude oil CRU
GAS Natural gas GAS
OIL Refined oil products OIL
ELE Electricity ELE
Non-Energy
EIS Energy-intensive sectors CRP, I_S, NFM, NMM, PPP, TRN
ROI Rest of industry AGR, CNS, DWE, FPR, LUM, OME, OMF,
OMN, SER, T_T, TWL
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Table B.2: Regional aggregation
Regions in GTAP-EG
ARG Argentina MYS Malaysia
AUS Australia NZL New Zealand
BRA Brazil PHL Philippines
CAM Central America and Caribbean RAP Rest of Andean Pact
CAN Canada RAS Rest of South Asia
CEA Central European Associates REU Rest of EU
CHL Chile RME Rest of Middle East
CHN China RNF Rest of North Africa
COL Columbia ROW Rest of World
DEU Germany RSA Rest of South Africa
DNK Denmark RSM Rest of South America
EFT European Free Trade Area RSS Rest of South-Saharan Africa
FIN Finland SAF South Africa
FSU Former Soviet Union SGP Singapore
GBR United Kingdom SWE Sweden
HKG Hong Kong THA Thailand
IDN Indonesia TUR Turkey
IND India TWN Taiwan
JPN Japan URY Uruguay
KOR Republic of Korea USA United States of America
LKA Sri Lanka VEN Venezuela
MAR Morocco VNM Vietnam
MEX Mexico
Mapping from GTAP-EG regions to model regions as of Table 1
Annex B
USA United States USA
EUR OECD Europe (incl. EFTA) DEU, DNK, EFT, FIN, GBR, REU, SWE
JPN Japan JPN
CAN Canada CAN
AUN Australia, New Zealand AUS, NZL
EEC Central and Eastern Europe CEA
FSU Former Soviet Union FSU
Non-Annex B
ROW Rest of the World KOR, LKA, MYS, PHL, RAS, SGP, THA, TWN,
VNM, IDN, MEX, RME, RNF, VEN, MAR, ROW,
RSA, RSS, SAF, TUR
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Appendix C: Baseline Projections - Forward Calibration
The magnitude and distribution of abatement costs associated with the implementation
of the Kyoto emission constraints crucially depend on the business-as-usual (BaU) projections
for GDP, fuel prices, energy efficiency improvements, etc. In our comparative-static
framework, we infer the BaU economic structure of the model’s regions for the year 2010
using most recent projections by the U.S. Department of Energy (IEO 2001) for GDP growth,
fossil fuel production, and future energy prices. We incorporate autonomous energy efficiency
improvement factors which scale energy demand functions to match the exogenous IEO
emission forecasts. The concrete forward calibration of the model entails three steps.
First, we fix the time profile of fossil fuel supplies from the model's regions to the
exogenous baseline projections by making supplies inelastic and scaling sector-specific
resources with the exogenous growth rates in fossil fuel production. This allows us to partially
control the emission profile from the supply side. Within the BaU calculation, we
endogenously adjust the resource endowments of fossil fuels to calibrate the model to given
exogenous target prices for fossil fuels. At the same time we incorporate exogenous, region-
specific GDP growth rates to scale the labor and capital stock of our static model.
Second, we incorporate exogenous autonomous energy efficiency improvements
(AEEI) to match the exogenous carbon emission profiles as provided by IEO. The AEEI
reflects the rate of change in energy intensity, i.e. the ratio of energy consumption over gross
domestic product, holding energy prices constant. It is a measure of all non-price induced
changes in gross energy intensity including technical developments that increase energy
efficiency as well as structural changes.
Third, we recalibrate fossil fuel supply functions locally to exogenous estimates of
supply elasticities. The last step assures empirical reaction of fossil fuel production to policy
induced changes in world energy prices of fuels.
To account for the importance of exogenous baseline projections, the model can be
calibrated to alternative data sources in an automated way. In the current set-up, one can
perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the three different core scenarios of IEO: low
economic growth, reference case, and high economic growth.
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Appendix D: GHG Emission Reduction Targets for Annex-B countries
Labela Original Kyoto Targets (OLD)b
(% of 1990 base year GHG emissions)
Revised Targets (NEW)c
(% of 1990 base year GHG emissions)
Australia AUN 108 110.7
Austria      EUR 87 92.9
Belgium      EUR 92.5 93.8
Bulgaria EEC 92 95.2
Canada      CAN 94 107.9
Croatia      EEC 95 95
Czech Republic EEC 92 94.1
Denmark EUR 79 81.1
Estonia FSU 92 94.7
Finland      EUR 100 107.8
France      EUR 100 103.9
Germany EUR 79 80.7
Greece      EUR 125 133.1
Hungary      EEC 94 97.8
Iceland      EUR 110 118
Ireland      EUR 113 116.2
Italy      EUR 93.5 95.3
Japan      JPN 94 99.2
Latvia      FSU 92 98
Liechtenstein EUR 92 107.9
Lithuania EUR 92 96.5
Luxemburg  EUR 72 79.6
Monaco      EUR 92 93
Netherlands EUR 94 95.2
New Zealand AUN 100 107
Norway      EUR 101 105.3
Poland      EEC 94 96.5
Portugal EUR 127 130.7
Romania CEA 92 96.2
Russian Federation FSU 100 105.7
Slovakia EEC 92 96.3
Slovenia EEC 92 100.4
Spain      EUR 115 118.9
Sweden      EUR 104 109.5
Switzerland EUR 92 96.6
Ukraine      FSU 100 102.4
United Kingdom EUR 87.5 88.8
United States USA 93 96.8
a
 Label of aggregate model region which includes the respective Annex B country
b
 UNFCCC (1997)
c
 Estimates by the European Commission accounting for sink credits as agreed in Bonn and Marrakesh (Nemry 2001)
